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Book Reviews
KENrucx PaAcrlcE Fomvs. By W. Lewis Roberts. St. Paul, Minn.,
West Publishing Co., 1953. xxv, 761 pp.
During the past year it has been my privilege to witness the creation by W. Lewis Roberts, Professor Emeritus of the University of
Kentucky College of Law, of a work which I believe destined to fulfill an important need for substantial numbers of the Kentucky bar.
With the acceptance of the New Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,
a major change has occurred in our practice, the extent and nature of
which are bound to be questions troublesome to bar and judiciary
alike.
It is an oversimplification to say that demurrers are abolished, that
one need no longer state a cause of action, and pleadings now need
only give notice of the nature of the cause and need not reach an
issue. It helps to know that the pleadings are now construed for the
pleader rather than against him and are to be viewed liberally so that
all meritorious causes may prevail. It cheers the slipshod lawyer to
know that his errors need no longer result in the loss of his client's
cause. He may even perceive that the dead demurrer has risen in
three new guises as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion
to strike for failure to state a claim, and a motion for summary judgment. He may be comforted by the assurance that what was good
pleading under the Code will in practically all cases be good pleading
under the New Rules.
However, the good lawyer will want to know when he can object
to an opponent's pleading, and the extent to which he may escape
objection in turn. He will want to know, for example, that a written
contract can now be sued on in three ways: it may be set forth verbatim, pleaded by exhibit, or pleaded according to its legal effect.
Formerly, of course, the substance of the contract had to be set forth
and the copy of the writing attached.
It will thus be seen that substantial changes have been effected by
the New Rules without the New Rules' being explicit as to what the
changes are. Dr. Roberts has sought to answer the questions which
will arise in every lawyer's mind in a very practical manner. He has
synthesized his examination of the Federal decisions and all available
form books of the Federal system into a single volume of 761 pages
which includes accepted forms covering the most common situations
with which the practicing lawyer is confronted. There are roughly
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two thousand sections in the book, the majority of which are the
forms, the others being comment upon the changes from the old to
the new practice.
I can think of no clearer way to illustrate the design and format
of the book than to pick at random one or two of the author's sections
for visual representation:
§ 181. Requisites for Complaint in an Action on a
Written Contract.
In a suit on a written contract, the Kentucky decisions
have required that the contract be set out verbatim;' or, if
the writing sued on is not copied in the petition, the substance of the writing was required to be set forth 2 To
use the words of Judge Willis in the case of Crawford v.
Crawford: "It is a rule of long practice in this state that a
promise or agreement to pay must be averred to make a
petition thereon good, and the mere exhibition of the writing will not supply an omission to allege a promise or agreement to pay.... A pleading is sufficient if it sets out the
contracts in its words, or in other words constituting the
substance of the contract."3
Under the new rules a plaintiff may set forth the contract verbatim in the complaint or plead it by exhibit or
plead according to its legal effect. This is pointed out in the
note to Official Form 12 of the Federal Rules of Procedure
and it is further stated that the plaintiff may ask for legal
or equitable relief or both although this was not allowed
under the earlier rules of pleading.
Since the new rules of procedure in this state follow the
Federal rules and official forms for the most part, this statement in the note mentioned above is applicable to our new
rules of civil procedure as it has been in other states that
have adopted the Federal rules. Rule 10.01 requires that
every pleading shall have a caption. This caption consists
(1) of the name of the court, (2) the style of the action,
(8) a file number, and (4) a designation as provided in
Rule 7.01. In the case of the complaint, where there are two
or more parties plaintiff or defendant, the names of all the
'Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hensley, 1926, 215 Ky. 45, 284 S.W. 425.
'Davidson v. Falls, 1926, 215 Ky. 368, 285 S.W. 209.
'1928, 222 Ky. 708, 2 S.W. 2d 401.
'28 U. S. C. A. (1946 ed.) p. 8342.
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parties must be set forth. This is practically the same as
Section 110 of the Civil Code, now repealed.
The requirement of Rule 11 must also be borne in mind
in drawing complaints. Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney must be signed by at least one attorney and the address of the attorney given.
The caption given in Official Form 1 is as follows:
Franklin Circuit Court
Civil Action, File Number ............
John Doe, Plaintiff
V.
Richard Roe, Defendant
Summons
§ 182. Complaintin a Suit for Breach of Agreement to
Compromise a Pending Action
[Caption]
1. On the .......

day of .......

,19 ...... , an action

was pending between the parties to this action, brought

by the plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of
................ dollars, which defendant owed plaintiff, but which
the defendant disputed.
2. In consideration of the plaintiff's discontinuing such
action at law and accepting ................ dollars in satisfaction
of the disputed claim, defendant promised to pay plaintiff
the sum of ................ dollars [on the ................ day of
................
,19 ......
].
3. Plaintiff thereupon discontinued the action. [Or,
Plaintiff has duly performed all the conditions of said agreement on his part.]
4. No part of said sum has been paid [except the sum
of, etc.] Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against
defendant for ................ dollars, with interest and costs of
suit.
Signed: ..............................................................
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Address: ............................................................
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AUTHORS COMMENT
Recent Kentucky decisions on compromising suits are
McCreary County v. Bybee, 1946, 801 Ky. 794, 193 S.W. 2d
423; Wilson v. Hillman, 1948, 306 Ky. 508, 208 S.W. 2d 493;
Sutton v. Moore, 1949, 309 Ky. 229, 217 S.W. 2d 321; Moore
v. Sutton, 1950, 311 Ky. 174, 223 S.W. 2d 737; and Murphy
v. Henry, 1950, 311 Ky. 799, 225 S.W. 2d 662. In Sutton v.
Moore, the court quoted with approval the case of Nuckols
v. Nuckols, 1942, 293 Ky. 603, 169 S.W. 2d 828 (1942) the
following passage: "It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
an agreement of compromise is supported by sufficient consideration where it is in settlement of a claim which is unliquidated, or in the settlement of a claim in dispute, or one
which is in doubt."
The text and comment which accompany many of the forms will
undoubtedly be invaluable to owners of the book. While I would not
suggest for the moment that the diligent lawyer may dispense with
perusal of Moore's Federal Practice, or more voluminous compendiums
of forms (such as West's Federal Forms 8 vol. 1953; Barron and
Holtzoff's Federal Practice and Procedure, 7 vol. 1950; and Ohlinger's
Federal Practice, 8 vol. 1941; etc.), where available, certainly this work
will serve as a valuable aid in the small office, or large one as well, as a
book of ready refeernce which will in most instances suffice.
It should be observed that the author has here created a pioneer
work under the handicap of having no state decisions under the New
Rules for guidance. Careful attention has been paid to differences between the Federal rules and the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
wherever they have appeared. Many attorneys have offered suggestions which have been diligently appraised, and in some instances
incorporated into the text. For errata and changes in the law which
will undoubtedly appear, provision is made for correction by inserts
in the rear flap of the book. The first of the annual supplements which
are contemplated is now being readied for publication. Included in
the supplements will be new forms, as they seem desirable, and commentaries on recent Federal decisions. Section 1025 of the present
supplement, for example, deals with Recent Federal Decisions Bearing
on Defenses.
In this brief review I have tried to convey my belief that Dr.
Roberts, within the limitation of a one-volume form book created in
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the absence of state decision, has created a notable achievement in a
work which will be of service of the bar of this state for years to come.
ALFm B. MCEWEN
University of Kentucky
College of Law

Tim SocAL

ImpAcr OF THm WARsAw CoNvENIoN. By Harold J. Sherman. New York: Exposition Press, 1952. Pp. 156.

The main title of this book is misleading; the actual subject matter
of the book is covered accurately by the subtitle, "A Critique of the
Lee Decisions on the Warsaw Convention and a Plea for Early Rectification." The author is much disturbed by the decision of the New
York Courts in the Lee case' and the denial by the United States
Supreme Court of an appeal by the Lees for a judicial review on the
merits of the final judgments.2 Since Pan American Airways invoked
in its defense the provisions of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, Mr.
Sherman argues that the courts permitted the provisions of a treaty
to nullify a right guaranteed in the Seventh Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, namely, the right of trial by jury "in suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars. ..."
In view of the proposed amendment to the Constitution sponsored
by Senator Bricker, this ought to be a very timely, significant and provocative book. If the author had succeeded in proving his thesis his
book would indeed be an effective support of the contention of the
Bricker amendment supporters, but in the opinion of the reviewer Mr.
Sherman fails to establish the necessary connecting links to make his
case valid. It is true that the Convention by limiting the liability of
the carrier for each passenger did restrict the legislative power of the
state of New York, but it did not thereby violate the provision of the
Seventh Amendment, because the first nine amendments are restrictions on the Federal government and not on the states. While the
courts in recent years have held that the basic provisions of the Bill
of Rights are included under the Fourteenth Amendment there is no
decision holding that a specific provision like that at issue in this case
is covered by the broad restrictions on the states imposed by this
amendment. If the New York courts properly had jurisdiction in this
case the Seventh Amendment could not be invoked by the Lees. The
Lees had no right to a jury trial in the courts of the state of New York
'Lee et al v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 118 N. Y. L. J.1548 (1947); 275
App. Div. 855, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1949).
2339 U. S. 920 (1950).

